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For more than one hundred years, Australian governments have supported the principle that the 
employment relationship of public servants should be independent of direct control by 
politicians. In recent decades, concern has been expressed that the independence of public 
servants has been undermined and that they have become politicised. Scholarly examination of 
the issue has been somewhat limited by the absence of a clear definition of what is meant by 
politicisation, with the term being associated both with the exercise of control over the human 
resource management (HRM) elements of the relationship as well as the tasks performed by 
public servants. The purpose of this paper is to establish a valid definition of politicisation 






Many scholars (Campbell and Halligan 1992; Hawkes 1999; Keating 2002; Podger 2007; 
Shergold 2007; Wilenski 1986), as well as numerous journals and other general commentators 
have discussed the issue of public service politicisation. However, politicisation in the context of 
the civil/public service tends to have a variety of meanings and there is a tendency to regard all 
political activities of public servants as part of a politicisation process (Curnow 1989; Haidar and 
Pullin 2004; Mulgan 1998; Parker 1989a; Weller 1989). The viewing of politicisation in terms of 
the actions of public servants is problematic and has confused scholarly debate. Public servants 
have been regarded as politicised because they themselves are politically aligned or their 
actions are seen to be political. Public servants can be no more immune from ‗being political‘ 
than any other person who holds views and votes. Similarly, public servants in implementing the 
policies of a government must also be seen to inevitably act politically. Parker (1989b) 
concluded that politicisation remains a very imprecise term and this lack of precision has 
confused the debate regarding politicisation of the public service.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to establish a definition of politicisation which has a validity based 
upon historical analysis and a meaning derived through the defining of its extreme opposite, the 
independent. In Section 1 of this paper, the key distinguishing characteristics of the politicised 
employment relationship are derived through an analysis of the traditional patronage system. In 
Section II, the key distinguishing characteristics of the independent employment relationship are 
derived through an analysis of the independent civil system established to replace the 
patronage model system. 
 
 
The Employment Relationship under the Patronage System 
 
From the literature, it can be seen that patronage has a very long history in Britain and that, 
together with other British colonies, Australia inherited much of its language, laws, institutional 
arrangements and cultural aspects from England, including its system of political patronage 
(Spry 2000; 5-8). It is also apparent from the literature, that the development of the independent 
civil service model in Britain and in Australia was in direct response to the perceived evil effects 
of political patronage (Bourne 1986; Hanham 1960b; McMartin 1959; Spry 2000). However, the 
Australian system of government is not a duplicate of its colonists‘ and therefore the nature of 
patronage power of the employment relationship of administrators in Australia as well as in 
England must be examined in order to identify the distinguishing features of the politicised type. 
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It is apparent from the literature that important insights to the nature of political patronage power 
of the employment relationship of administrators can be gleaned through an examination of the 
experiences of the United States of America (USA) and of special interest is Eaton‘s (1880) 
seminal study of political patronage (Rosenbloom 2008; Wheeler 1919). The USA‘s extreme 
experiences of a corrupt and pervasive spoils system which dominated political, economic and 
social life after the American civil war (Josephson 1938) assist this study by drawing attention to 
the heterogeneous nature of patronage and spoils systems over time and in different national 
contexts.  
 
According to Bourne (1986), the earliest use of the word patron in English appears to have been 
in the special ecclesiastical sense of the holder of an advowson, with the right of presentation to 
a living or benefice. He maintains that all dictionaries of consequence, from Dr Johnson's of 
1755 to Webster's Thesaurus of 1976, include this aspect as part of their definition of patronage 
as well as general definitions of patronage in the sense of 'protection', 'benefaction', 
'sponsorship', 'guardianship', ‗both by gods, saints and men‘, although Webster's dictionary of 
1890 appears to be the first to include 'the right of nomination to public offices' (Bourne 1986; 
4). Bourne argues that ‗the essence of patronage is…. inequality, reciprocity and intimacy. 
Patronage is a relationship between individuals of unequal status, wealth and influence...(it) 
involves a bargain, a mutually satisfactory exchange of services, between patron and client‘ 
(Bourne 1986; 5). In the Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy, Klingner 
(2003) provides the following definition: ‗Patronage is a public personnel system characterized 
by maintenance of political or personal loyalty through legislative or executive approval of 
individual hiring decisions; spoils is the practice by which successful electoral candidates 
reward individuals for personal or political loyalty, and secure their continued cooperation during 
their term of office by awarding them public jobs. The important difference in the meanings 
associated with the terms patronage and spoils lies with the latter‘s association with a reciprocal 
relationship. While patronage is based upon loyalties and obligations derived from class and 
position, spoils at least connote a reward in return for a favour or support. Thus, spoils have 
been associated with corruption in a way that patronage has not.  
 
The highly corrupt and controversial spoils system evident in North America became a major 
focus for political reform (Eaton 1880; Stahl 1971). In contrast, patronage in Britain was 
‗politically insignificant basically because British politicians had never turned it into a ‗spoils 
system‘ (Richards 1963; 41). Richards (1963; 17-18), however, argues that ‗Patronage is of 
cause, an emotive word. It is associated in the public mind with a variety of abuses, for it 
provides obvious opportunities for corruption, peculation, undercover influence and power 
seeking of various kinds. All of these are not of the essence of patronage; they are merely 
probable consequences unless measures are taken to avoid such evil effects.‘ It was the British 
system of patronage that was adopted in Australia and its definitions provide important insights 
to the nature of the variables defining the politicised type: who exercises power over the 
employment relationship is an individual possessing personal power derived through birth, 
wealth or political power; and how it is exercised is arbitrary or at the discretion of the individual 
with patronage power. The rationale associated with patronage, why it occurs, concerns a social 
system of reciprocal loyalties. 
 
The system of patronage which defined the unreformed Civil Service in Great Britain and its 
colonies, including the Australian, was founded upon ‗the theory of feudal times, that public 
offices are the property of the ruler‘ (Eaton 1880; iii). Patronage in feudal times meant that the 
monarch could and did bestow public office as he saw fit and for his own benefit, without regard 
to the capacity of the person to perform his duties or the best interests of the society. Until the 
nineteenth century, challenges to patronage were mainly directed not at ending the system but 
rather at shifting the power to dispense it. Attempts by the barons from the thirteenth century 
onwards to limit the power of the king ‗all relied on replacing royal power with power by a group 
of barons‘ (Drew 2004; 50). The first documented account of public opinion forcing some 
change in the use of patronage was early in the thirteenth century when the King was 
compelled to choose his subordinate ministers with some reference to their capacity for 
business (Eaton 1880; 14; Stubbs 1967; 355). The Magna Carta of 1215, signed by King John 
of England under pressure from the barons and other notables, provided that the king was not 
to make any justices, constables, sheriffs, or bailiffs but of such as know the law of the realm. It 
was a declaration that public offices should be occupied by those who were competent and not 
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merely by royal patronage. This Forty-fifth Article of the Magna Carta has been regarded as the 
first Civil Service Rule (Eaton 1880; iv). Hence, in terms of how appointments were made, the 
politicised type features patronage relationships, whereas the independent type demonstrates 
needed competencies. 
 
Finer (1937; 31) argues that there have been two main periods of occupation with reform in the 
Civil Service in Great Britain and that the first covers the years 1689-1855 (Finer 1937; 31). The 
overthrow of King James II of England in the Revolution of 1689 marked the beginning of 
modern English parliamentary democracy and the end of the monarch‘s absolute power. The 
Crown was removed of its power of patronage over public offices but attention was not directed 
towards improving the quality of the officials but rather ‗the political purity of the House of 
Commons and the electors‘ (Finer 1937; 31). ‗Civil offices were thus a pawn in the struggle 
between Parliament and the King‘ (Finer 1937; 31). Although the power of patronage over 
public offices passed from the monarch to parliament, the earliest holders of such offices 
comprised merely the ‗ministers, personal secretaries and household servants of the King, and 
the tradition of personal relationship to the sovereign persisted until well into the eighteenth 
century, when tenures under the Crown had grown to include a mass of customs, excise and 
postal offices. These were sufficient in number to provide a rich field for patronage. But the 
corruption which followed and the incompetence of a Civil Service recruited solely by reference 
to family or political influence, only remained tolerable while the functions of government were 
comparatively simple and limited‘ (Parker 1942; 17). Hence, as patronage power shifted from 
the monarch to politicians, appointments continued to be based upon a system of personal 
relationships rather than the competencies of those appointed. 
 
Patronage in eighteenth century England was ‗a fact of life, as unremarkable as it was obvious‘ 
and involved, to varying degrees, the whole of English society (Bourne 1986; 3 and 15). In 
Weber‘s (1968) terms it was based upon traditional rather than rational-legal powers. Although 
the relationship is one of unequals, the types of patronage available in nineteenth-century 
England were numerous and the level of inequality varied. The extent of reciprocity also varied 
and that the ‗possession of patronage could be a curse as well as a blessing, leaving the patron 
victim to greed and ambition and corrosive flattery distilled from the insistent responsibilities of 
family, the embarrassing expectations of neighbours and friends and the intrigues of women, as 
well as exposing him to the ingratitude and contempt of the satisfied and the calumnies and 
malice of the disappointed‘ (Bourne 1986; 6-7). The forms of patronage in nineteenth-century 
England were complex and unsystematic, with the patron and client sometimes unknown to one 
another, the relationship having been brokered by a middleman (Bourne 1986; 7 and 13). Under 
the patronage system, power over the employment relationship of public service was exercised 
by the patron, often a politician, according to undisclosed, personal and sometimes whimsical 
standards. The exercise of power featured concealment from public scrutiny.  
 
In the absence of party discipline, patronage was central to the working of the constitution, the 
smooth running of parliament and the general political stability of the country, as it helped to 
ensure an administration which was acceptable to the Crown and to the House of Commons 
(Hanham 1960a; 16-17). Similar arguments in support of patronage are evident in more recent 
times. Richards (1963;17) makes the point that a ‗sharp distinction between appointments made 
for the good of a service and those made for political reasons is clear in theory but can be 
obscure in practice‘. Regardless of the associated stated rationale, appointments and 
promotions by individuals exercising their personal discretion rather than in accordance with 
formally established guidelines is a feature of the politicised type.  
 
The patronage system features the exercise of power over the employment relationship of 
administrators by individuals possessing patronage power derived from their family, wealth or 
political influence. This power is exercised in accordance with their own personal discretion. 
Appointments are made to offices according to notions of merit defined by the patron rather 
than a formal test or other criteria subject to external scrutiny. Under the politicised archetype, 
the power of politicians is not formally derived from their family, wealth or political influence but 
rather from the law which grants them certain powers as elected members of representative 
government but their power is exercised in accordance with their own personal discretion rather 
than formal, legally based standards. Within the politicised archetype, it is therefore unknown as 
to the influence of their family, wealth or political influence upon the exercise of their power. 
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In 1780, Burke led the attack on political patronage and Finer (1937;32) argues that Burke 'was 
perhaps the first statesman to see the problem of the Civil Service as one of the efficiency of the 
administrative branch of government, although McMartin (1959) asserts that his motives were 
political and constitutional rather than administrative. Sinecures were virtually abolished and the 
remaining patronage was limited, restrained and increasingly regulated in the interests of 
efficiency (Bourne 1986; 23). Although public offices could still be filled by personal nomination, 
appointment was subject to a rudimentary test which could only be given to men whose merit 
and qualifications had been subject to some rudimentary test. These examinations were not 
competitive, but they tried to ensure that those who were nominated possessed a basic 
competence, which served in turn to justify the method of appointment. This marked the 
beginning of a movement away from the politicised civil service to the independent type which 
was developed over the ensuing century or more and encapsulated in the seminal work of 
Northcote-Trevelyan (1854). 
 
The detail of how patronage was exercised during its peak in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries is not well documented and there has been comparatively little historical 
work focusing on the subject of patronage because documentary records of patronage were 
prone to disposal (Bourne 1986; 9-10, Hamilton 2000; 51,55, Richards 1963; 7). The Treasury 
was the main British department of state concerned with appointments and it traditionally 
destroyed its records. ‗Perhaps not surprisingly, few wished to keep the mass of letters praying 
for government appointment that were received by any man in high public office before the 
introduction of competitive entry examinations. As soon as new posts were mooted, or the 
rumours spread that one man had resigned, or another had died in office, or even was close to 
death and his salary might be claimed by someone whose letter of appeal was the first to reach 
a man of influence, then innumerable letters were posted reciting past services and 
connections, often heavily salted with harrowing tales of privation, and the continuing burden of 
aged relatives, sorrowing wives, and numerous children‘ (Hamilton 2000; 50). This lack of 
transparency regarding how appointments, promotions and rewards are determined is a 
distinguishing feature of the politicised type.  
 
The distinguishing features of the patronage system evident in Britain were also present in the 
Australian colonies. When first founded as a Crown Colony, NSW was administered under 
martial law by the governor and his officers (Parker 1942; 9). During the first fifty years after 
settlement, the lands of Australia were administered by officials appointed from England, paid 
from England, and considered part of the military. Indeed, their liability was to military rather 
than civil law (Kendall 1997; 230, McMartin 1959; 326). Each colony had its affairs, except 
where these were of a naval or military nature, administered by officials known as the civil 
establishment (McMartin 1959; 326). Appointments to public office, in Australia as in the English 
civil service, were made under a system of patronage. Laidlaw (2005;102) describes those who 
sought and obtained colonial office as sharing some ‗common characteristics in social 
background‘; they were mostly ‗pseudo-gentry‘, finally insecure but aspiring to the gentry. All 
above the rank of superintendent held their position by virtue of a commission granted in 
England or were appointed by the governor, subject to ratification by the British Colonial Office 
(McMartin 1959; 326, Parker 1942; 19).  
 
Parker (1942) asserts that Governor Macquarie ‗paid some regard to capacity and integrity‘ but 
his ‗efforts could not overcome the tradition of appointments by patronage‘. Finer (1937;33) has 
argued that India and the American colonies were the greatest sufferers from these ‗place-men‘, 
officials appointed through political patronage and that ‗owing to them the Colonies were lost‘. 
The British, wounded by the American revolution, were intent upon ensuring a strong and 
competent executive in the colonial governments and in 1812 the first Colonial Office was 
established, regarded as essential if the British Empire was to survive (Halevy 1949; 98; 
McMartin 1959; 329). McMartin (1959, 1983) in his study of patronage in Australia from 1786 to 
1836, found that the quality of senior officials was generally high, although there were examples 
of laxity and more serious offences. ‗[T]he exercise of patronage was, in a surprising number of 
instances, governed by considerations of administrative efficiency rather than of political 
advantage‘ (McMartin 1983; 11). Certainly there were problems concerning the appropriateness 
of some public service appointees as noted by Curnow and Page (1989;57) who note that 
‗reference was made in the House of the number of ‗gentlemen‘ who had been ‗found guilty of 
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defalcation in the Public Service‘‘ and the ‗seven or eight officers charges with defrauding the 
revenue of large sums of money‘.  
 
It is important to recognise that under the patronage system attention was at least sometimes 
paid to the capacity and competency of appointees. Such concerns did not change the 
fundamental nature of the patronage system: power over the employment relationship was 
exercised directly by patrons or politicians according to their own personal standards which may 
or may not have included the competency of appointees. Thus the rationale or purpose of 
particular decisions did not cause the patronage system to be other than what it was. A concern 
with the competency of appointees did not change its fundamental nature although it may have 
influenced some aspects of its consequences. The patronage system varied in the corruption 
and incompetency it exhibited. Similarly, the politicised archetype may include the exercise of 
power by politicians for purposes associated with the capacity and competence of appointees. 
The rationale associated with politicians‘ personal HRM decisions, the personal standards 
which they apply, does not alter the fundamental nature of the politicised archetype. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, decisions explained in terms of personalisation (Weller 2001) or 
responsiveness (Keating 1999) provide no more evidence of an absence of politicisation than of 
patronage. It is the exercise of direct control by politicians over the employment relationship and 
the exercise of such power according to personal rather than rational or formal and impersonal 
standards which distinguished the patronage system and which are characteristic of the 
politicised archetype.  
 
Personal relationships often underpinned the patronage relationship and provided the basis for 
personal communications between colonial officials and the Colonial Office in Britain was an 
important source of information (Laidlaw 2005; 201). Senior colonist officials were rarely 
appointed directly from London, but would rather be more likely to first spend some time in a 
more subordinate role before seeking promotion (Laidlaw 2005; 106). As officials rose in the 
colonial hierarchy, their role in the chain of patronage also altered and they would often become 
patrons themselves or brokers (Laidlaw 2005; 106-7). Parker (1942; 19) argues that the 
tradition of patronage was so strong in the Australian colonies that when the colonists objected, 
they were not concerned with ‗its manifest ill-effects on efficiency, but to the fact that the final 
distribution of patronage, still lay with the British Colonial Secretary‘. In 1850, the NSW 
Legislative Council passed a resolution that the ‗advanced state of Society in the Colony‘ 
warranted that patronage for the appointment to public offices in NSW should be ‗absolutely 
vested in the local Executive‘ (Parker 1942:20). By the early 1880s, patronage by the British 
Colonial Secretary in regard to Australia was limited, except for Western Australia which was 
still a Crown Colony, to the appointment of governors (Powell 2005). 
 
In summary, the exercise of direct control over the employment relationship of civil service 
administrators according to personal and formally undisclosed standards was the dominant 
characteristic of the patronage system. Control was exercised through recruitment, promotion 
and remuneration decisions by individuals exercising their power according to personal and 
undisclosed standards which were not subject to review and were lacking in transparency. The 
rationale associated with such decisions, whilst based upon personal values and objectives may 
have included concerns with efficiency, feeling comfortable with appointees and certainly with a 
desire to ensure that appointees were responsive to their needs. These characteristics of the 




The Employment Relationship under the Independent Civil Service Model 
 
The distinguishing features of the independent civil service emerged incrementally and 
sporadically over a great many years and frequently movements towards the establishment of 
its defining features were subsequently reversed, only to be modified and latter advanced. 
Although the Forty-fifth Article of the Magna Carta 1215 required a consideration of appointees‘ 
capacity, more than six hundred years passed before the establishment of a rational-legal 
requirement that appointees would be assessed as to their capacity through a formal and 
transparent process independent of the will of politicians and other rulers. There is certainly 
evidence that concerns regarding the competency of appointees were common throughout the 
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history of patronage, but the greatest efforts for change were focussed upon gaining power of 
patronage rather than upon challenging the system itself. It was not until the 1880s in Britain 
that control of the employment relationship of civil servants moved from Weber‘s (1968) 
traditional to rational-legal forms of domination, as the distinguishing exclusive dimensions of 
the independent ideal type began to be subject to legislation.  
 
The exhaustive features of the independent type were established incrementally during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries and were never promulgated as a comprehensive creed. 
This has no doubt contributed to the conceptual difficulties associated with conducting empirical 
research concerning whether particular public sector employment relationships conform to the 
principles of an independent civil service model or are politicised as demonstrated in the 
patronage system. Such research requires the development of a solid conceptual framework 
and that proposed for this study requires the identification of the exclusive and exhaustive 
features of the independent archetype which will be deduced from those of the system 
established to eradicate patronage.  
 
The Northcote-Trevelyan (1854) Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service has 
been widely recognised as marking, at least symbolically, the establishment of the modern civil 
service in Britain, as it encapsulated and articulated the principles emerging and gradually being 
established to move the employment relationship of civil servants from patronage to rational-
legal power (Butler 1993; Eaton 1880; Finer 1937; Fry 1979; Greenaway 2004; Hennessy 1989; 
Hoogenboom 1961; Hughes 1954; Parker 1942; Richards 1963; Spann 1973; Vandenabeele 
and Horton 2005). ‗Ideas from Northcote Trevelyan were freely available to colonial institution 
builders‘ and the evolution of the Australian public service ‗ran parallel in time with the 
refashioning of the UK civil service‘ (Smith and Corbett 1999; 31). The Northcote-Trevelyan 
Report (1854) was not an isolated reform but rather historically and ideologically situated within 
a wave of evangelical reforms which included the British abolition of slavery (Hochschild 2005). 
Reform of government gained popular support in the 1700s, the century of Enlightenment, amid 
‗the rising tide of Puritanism‘ (Richards 1963; 35). As the power of the King declined and that of 
his Ministers grew, the spread of democratic ideas slowly increased (Richards 1963).  
 
Although a great deal of attention was focused on the difficulties caused by patronage, the root 
cause of the problem facing the civil service after responsible government was the lack of 
strong central power of administration (Curnow and Page 1989; 59). An Act of 1810 in England 
‗established a general and comprehensive superannuation scheme for all public officers well 
before the establishment of any unified regulations for salaries of public officers‘ (Fry 1979; 94). 
Whilst comprehensive superannuation might support the principles of the independent type, 
their provision does not represent an exclusive feature, as those appointed under a system of 
patronage, the politicised type, might also enjoy superannuation. Jeremy Bentham, writing 
between 1810-1830, proposed a general basis for the reform of patronage including a code of 
official appointment, including oral exams for civil servants which has been acknowledged as 
pioneering work toward the establishment of a civil service independent of patronage power 
(Bentham and Schofield 1993; Finer 1937; Rosen and Burns 1983). John Stewart Mill (1993; 
209), whose writings on Utilitarianism and Considerations on Representative Government were 
first published in 1861, asserted that the machinery of government ‗is good, when the proper 
tests are prescribed for the qualifications of officers, the proper rules for their promotion…‘ Finer 
(1937;34) argues that the substantial reforms of the 1800s to the British civil service were the 
result of ‗the growing pressure of State activity, and the mental stimulus of the Utilitarian 
philosophy‘.  
 
Reform of the English Administration in India preceded and greatly influenced that which 
followed in Britain itself. A special school, Haileybury, had been established in 1813 for training 
those nominated to be Indian Civil Servants and entrants were required to undergo a difficult 
examination, but patronage continued to play a major role in both entry to the school and 
appointments (Finer 1937). An English Act of 1833 prescribed that four candidates were to be 
nominated for each vacancy and the nominees were then to compete in ‗an examination in such 
branches of knowledge and by such examiners as the Board (of Power) of the Company shall 
direct‘ (S. 105) (Finer 1937; 38). In 1853, the Charter of the East India Company came before 
Parliament for revision and Macauley secured the complete abolition of patronage and the 
acceptance of the principle of open competition of all comers (Finer 1937; 39). Open 
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competition was thus established as the first distinguishing and exclusive feature of the 
independent archetype and was implemented first in India. 
 
Meanwhile, ‗an extensive and careful inquiry‘ into the state of the establishment of the Treasury 
and various Departments was established by a Treasury minute of November 1848 (Finer 1937; 
40-41). Its primary purpose was to secure a greater degree of efficiency among the ‗body of 
permanent officials‘ (Fry 1969; 34). At the request of Gladestone, the inquiry was directed and 
in large part written by Sir Charles Trevelyan, the highest ranking official at the Treasury, who 
was later joined by Sir Stafford Northcote, an aspiring politician (Bulmer-Thomas 1965; Fry 
1969). The linkages between the reform of the Indian and that of the British civil services are 
strong. Trevelyan, brother in-law of Macauley, spent time at Haileybury before joining the staff 
of the East India Company for fourteen years in India (Richards 1963; 42). Trevelyan also 
clearly played a role in the establishment of the Inquiry which he subsequently conducted. In 
1848 he made a number of recommendations before a government Committee for 
reorganisation of the Treasury administration and these would later be included in his and 
Northcote‘s Reports. The recommendations were the ‗culmination of many years of thought and 
work, mainly on the part of Trevelyan‘ (Hart 1960; 106). The reports cover about 450 pages, 
including the General Report by Northcote-Trevelyan (1854), The Report on the Organisation of 
the Permanent Civil Service. This was the first time that the term ‗Civil Service‘ was used in 
reference to Home Establishments (Finer 1937; 40). The report was issued in November 1853, 
together with an educational opinion upon it by Benjamin Jowett, who collaborated with 
Macaulay in developing the reform proposals for the Indian civil service. It was published in 
1854 and was reprinted in the Public Administration journal (1954). 
 
The report found that the Civil Service was overstaffed and filled with individuals incapable of 
performing their duties and that those who sought to enter the Service were not the able and 
ambitious but ‗those whom indolence of temperament or physical infirmities unfit for active 
positions.‘ There was no advancement by merit, but by seniority, and entrants were for years, 
perhaps forever, doomed to the drudgery of mechanical copying. Their incompetence... 
necessitated appointments from outside to the higher posts… civil servants were habitually 
superseded because they were incompetent and incompetent because they were superseded… 
Examinations were held in some Departments… but the system was dominated by 
incompetence and corruption... The Departments were their own appointment authorities‘ (Finer 
1937; 41,  Northcote-Trevelyan Report 1854; 5-6). 
 
The proposals contained in the Northcote-Trevelyan (1854) Report consisted of those which 
Macaulay's Committee on the Selection and Training of Candidates for the Indian Civil Service 
was at about the same time recommending for India (Finer 1937). They concerned the abolition 
of patronage, the admission of young people into the Service at prescribed ages by means of 
open competitive examination, the appointment of a central board ‗composed of men holding an 
independent position‘ (Northcote-Trevelyan Report 1854;11) for the purpose of conducting 
these examinations, a short period of probation, promotion of officers on the basis of merit 
rather than seniority, the treatment of the Civil Service as a unified whole rather than as 
separate department units and the establishment of a classification system which distinguished 
between the intellectual and routine work of the Service (Bulmer-Thomas 1965; Finer 1937; 
Northcote-Trevelyan Report 1854; Richards 1963). ‗The general principle, then, which we 
advocate is, that the public service should be carried on by the admission into its lower ranks of 
a carefully selected body of young men… That with average abilities and reasonable application 
they may look forward confidently to a certain provision for their lives, that with superior powers 
that may rationally hope to attain to the highest prizes in the service…‘ (Northcote-Trevelyan 
Report 1854;9)  
 
It proposed that a unified examination system be established to test the suitability of candidates 
for Civil Service positions and that the right of competing should be open to all persons ‗of a 
given age‘ subject only to their providing satisfactory references regarding their ‗moral conduct 
and character‘ and medical certificates to verify that they have ‗no bodily infirmity likely to 
incapacitate them for the public service‘ (Northcote-Trevelyan Report 1854; 13). It was 
envisaged that in virtually all cases, appointment should be subject to a competitive examination 
which could test the ‗intelligence as well as the mere attainments of the candidates‘ and that in 
the case of ‗the superior situations(,) endeavours should be made to secure the services of the 
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most promising young men of the day, by a competing examination on a level with the highest 
description of education in this country‘ (Northcote-Trevelyan Report 1854; 11).The exclusive 
features of the independent type were thus emerging.  
 
There was a great deal of opposition in Government to the recommendations of the Northcote-
Trevelyan (1854) Report and no action was immediately taken but the public criticism of 
perceived administrative incompetence associated with the Crimea War contributed to a gradual 
introduction of the Report‘s recommendations (Richards 1963). Even Trevelyan‘s own practice 
of pressing the claims of relations for civil service positions and his approval of ‗the practice of 
appointing official‘s sons‘ was inconsistent with his stated views (Hart 1960; 98). In the 
aftermath of Northcote-Trevelyan, the Civil Service evolved ‗in a Lindblomian fashion‘ to 
gradually encompass the ideas outlined in the 1854 report (Cline 2008; 148). In 1858, 
legislation was passed establishing open competition for some appointments in India and the 
Order-in-Council of 1870 ‗directed that all vacancies in a list of offices be subject to open 
competition: the Foreign Office was excluded from the list. Thus 1870 is the watershed‘ 
(Richards 1963; 53). A Civil Service Commission was established to ensure the suitability of 
candidates, although appointment decisions remained with the departments.  
 
Incrementally and sporadically the Northcote-Trevelyan (1854) recommendations were 
implemented and extended. The powers of the Civil Service Commission in relation to 
recruitment were extended during the 1870s and from 1876 its powers in relation to promotion 
were also established (Richards 1963; 54-5). Despite these changes, the MacDonnell 
Commission of 1912 identified ‗remnants of patronage which it consistently condemned‘, 
identified that professional posts were still being filled by heads of departments often without 
public notification of vacancies and proposed ‗that all professional posts should be publicly 
advertised, and that the preliminary selection of candidates submitted to the Minister should be 
made not by any individual but by a committee including a representative of the Civil Service 
Commission‘ (Richards 1963; 57). The classification structure of the career civil service was 
subject to significant changes between 1870 and 1949 (Fry 1969). It took more than 50 years 
before the recommendations of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report (1854) were implemented in full 
(Vandenabeele and Horton 2005) and were finally given final shape by Warren Fisher in the 
early 1920s (Butler 1993). 
 
Examination of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report (1854) and of subsequent legislation provides 
the basis for identifying the distinguishing exclusive features of the independent type. Some of 
the features of the civil service employment relationship promulgated by Northcote-Trevelyan 
(1854) relate to historically bound notions of merit and do not pass the test of time to remain 
principles guiding the establishment of a rational-legal system of public administration. Specific 
references to entry at a young age, to limitations placed upon women, to the actual content and 
form of examinations, to infirmities and to the need to distinguish between intellectual and 
routine work are time relevant descriptors of merit which are not at the core of the principle 
values promulgated. The distinguishing and exclusive features of the independent type are the 
formal legal establishment of a body or organisation independent of politicians with officials 
appointed to discharge power over the employment relationship of civil servants in accordance 
with formal standards including: appointment on the basis of merit as determined by a formal 
and transparent process of examination to which all suitably qualified citizens are eligible to 
apply; a formalised career structure open to all appointees; a system of tenure supporting 
membership of a career service; promotions throughout the career service available to all its 
members through formal and transparent processes.  
 
The application of the principles of an independent civil service ‗to the Australian public services 
was simply a bodily transfer of some of the already well-tested English ideas‘ (Parker 1942; 19). 
In Australia, the nature of patronage changed over the years from British colonisation, through 
the establishment of responsible government in the colonies and up to the federation of 
Australia. By the 1830s, new land regulations and salary reductions meant that the new 
patronage offices did not carry with the benefit of financial gain associated with earlier periods 
(Laidlaw 2005; 108). Even after the colonies were granted constitutions and responsible 
government was established, no colonial government attempted to deal with the civil service by 
legislation until 1862 when the Victorian parliament passed an Act dealing with the subject of 
examinations (McMartin 1959; 326). Indeed, the movement for public sector reform in Australia 
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began in Victoria where in 1856, the year after the proclamation of the Colony‘s constitution, the 
Public Service was declared to be in such a state that the government appointed a royal 
commission to report as to the ‗strength and efficiency of the several departments of the public 
service‘ (Parker 1942; 21, Spann 1973; 365-6). In 1862, the Victorian parliament passed 
legislation establishing a qualifying examination for appointment to the public service, but 
appointments remained in practice in the gift of Ministers (Parker 1942; 21).  
 
The 1895 New South Wales (NSW) Royal Commission revolutionised the system of recruitment 
and power of the employment relationship and the principles adopted in the NSW Act of 1895 
were incorporated in the Commonwealth Public Service Act of 1902 (Bland 1944). The ‗evil 
effects of political patronage and official nepotism‘ were of considerable concern to those 
drafting the Australian Constitution and the rules that would govern employment in the 
Commonwealth public service (Spry 2000; 5-8). Benefiting by the experience of the States, the 
Commonwealth passed its Public Service Act in 1902. An independent agency exercising power 
over the employment relationship, appointment on merit, access to promotion and tenure 
subject to satisfactory performance comprise the key elements of the traditional career public 
service in Australia (RCAGA 1976; Spann 1973; Spooner and Haidar 2005). The 1902 Act 
vested power of the Service in a single Public Service Commissioner, appointed for seven years 
and eligible for reappointments; it also provided for up to six Public Service inspectors. The 
Commonwealth Service was divided into four divisions. Admission to it was to be by open 
competitive examination (Public Service Act 1902 (Cth)). The Commissioner was required to 
make recommendations to the Government regarding management and improve methods of 
work, and also to report annually to Parliament on possible improvements, especially for 
ensuring ‗efficiency and economy‘ (Australian Constitution: S. 28, Spann 1973; 370). A career 
service was established which protected the public service ‗against appointments and 
promotions by political influence and the official nepotism (whilst) aiming at rationality, 
consistency and fairness in classification, pay and promotions. In practice it took the form of 
recruiting all except techniques and professional staffs directly from school; guaranteeing 
progression in salary to the level of a family income‘ (Parker 1989c; 20).  
 
Although the APS from its origins in 1902 was governed by the principles of an independent 
career service, there was an on-going quest to actually achieve these standards. For the first 
twenty years after the establishment of the APS there was a good deal attention focused on 
reviewing and of changing aspects of the workings of its employment relations system. Between 
1914 and 1928, there were twelve Royal Commissions or Select Committees which inquired 
into the management of the APS (Spann 1973; 370). The 1902 Act was replaced by the Public 
Service Act 1922 (Public Service Act 1922 (Cth)) and this survived, despite numerous 
modifications, until its final replacement with the Public Service Act 1999 (Public Service Act 
1999 (Cth)). Entry to the Australian public service never was entirely restricted to young people 
for junior roles and as the level of education and of competencies expected of appointees rose, 
more graduates and older people with experiences outside the public service were appointed 
(Spann 1973). Despite legislative and other efforts designed to ensure promotions be made 
based upon considerations of ability and aptitude, the ‗preservation of seniority‘ remained an 
important factor for many years (Parker 1942; 191). The structure of the independent body 
exercising power over the APS employment relationships was altered from consisting of a 
single Public Service Commissioner to the establishment of the Commonwealth Public Service 
Board consisting of a Chairman and two Commissioners (Spann 1973) and later to the 
Australian Public Service Commission. Over time, the allocation of responsibilities in 
employment relations matters shifted between the independent body and departmental heads. 
However, from its establishment in 1902 until to the period concluding this study, the legislation 
governing the APS continued to espouse the essential core principles of the independent 
civil/public service model (Public Service Act 1999 (Cth)).  
 
The key distinguishing characteristics of the independent archetype derived from the analysis 
above are mirrored in the literature concerning the public service employment relationship 
established in Australia. Many writers have identified the distinguishing characteristics of the 
rational-legal system of public service employment established in Australia and in Britain as 
those defining a career service epitomised by the following characteristics: recruitment on merit, 
a unified service, control of recruitment and of the conditions of employment by a body 
independent of politicians; and where the rights of career servants are protected by regulations 
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which discourage the recruitment of ‗strangers‘ or outsiders to positions above the base grade 
and by legislated protection against arbitrary dismissal (Bland 1944; Colley 2002; Curnow and 
Page 1989; Fry 1969; O'Neill and Hughes 1998; Spann 1973; Woodard 2005). 
 
In summary, the independent archetype was not so much proclaimed but established 
incrementally. Whilst the recommendations of the Northcote-Trevelyan (1854) Report have 
come to epitomise the establishment of the independent civil service, it can be seen that 
process toward this end began well before their seminal report and its full elaboration may 
never have been made, even to this day. However, its key principles were clear and the British 
notions of an independent civil service were essentially adopted in Australia. The principles, the 
exclusive features of the independent archetype can be clearly identified both from the 
prescriptions, the principles, detailed in the various relevant reports and legislation but also 
through the values which underpinned these. The independent civil service model was 
established to fight and eradicate the patronage model. Much of the motivation for this 
development can be best explained in terms of the tasks domain: the patronage system had 
arguably resulted in an overstaffed and inefficient civil service and it was the objective of the 
independent civil service model to ensure that the civil service was economic and efficient. This 
grew to include the notion that ‗efficiency‘ meant that civil servants should be able to provide 
‗frank and fearless‘ advice and be able to service any government.  
 
The promulgation of the exclusive features of the independent civil service model, the exclusive 
distinguishing features of the independent archetype, was motivated by values associated with 
ensuring the quality, efficiency, independence of politicians and continuity of incumbents of 
public sector positions through the establishment of a body, a Board or a Commission, itself 
independent of politicians. This body would exercise power over the employment relationship 
according to formalised, impersonal and stable rules to ensure that recruitment was open to all 
and based upon a competitive system, that promotions would be based upon the merits of the 
applicants, that remuneration would be reflect the work performed according to a formal scale 
and that employment would occur within a career service offering tenure and pensions. Thus 
power would be exercised by a formal legally established body rather than by politicians, 





It is clear from an historical review of the development of the civil service in Britain and the 
public service in Australia, that certain principles concerning the exercise of power over the 
HRM domain of the employment relationship of civil/public servants were at the core of how 
reformers viewed the necessary steps to insure a movement away from the system of 
patronage. The critical factors differentiating a system of patronage, a politicised employment 
relationship, from an independent type, are concerned not with the task domain but rather with 
the HRM domain. The distinguishing characteristics of the politicised employment relationship, 
derived through analysis of the patronage system, concern the exercise of direct control by 
politicians over the key HRM processes of selection, promotion, remuneration and termination. 
The exclusive features within the HRM domain of the independent ideal type are: exercise of 
power by a body independent of politicians, recruitment and promotion through open 
competitive processes, employment within a career service which offers pre-determined 
remuneration based upon the job rather than the person, employment security and tenure. 
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